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I. Introduction
While health and safety regulations are often set 
at the state and federal level, many local jurisdic-
tions also have the power to enact workplace reg-
ulations. In particular, there is a growing trend 
toward local regulation of workplace smoking. To-
day, nearly 570 local municipalities and 21 states 
plus the District of Columbia have enacted 100% 
smoke-free laws in workplaces. Enacting the first 
local “clean indoor air” laws in 1973, Arizona led 
the way among states. These local workplace regu-
lations have the potential to influence the aggregate 
level of industry activity, business costs, and labor 
market behavior of workers. This is particularly 
true of the bar and restaurant industries, and other 
recreation and entertainment industries, since busi-
ness owners in these industries frequently choose 
to allow smoking.
Health advocates support local smoking ordi-
nances as a public health strategy to enhance the 
safety of workplaces.1 But like all such safety regu-
lations, including safety regulations at construction 
sites, mines, or manufacturing plants, smoke-free 
laws have potential to introduce economic ineffi-
ciencies. Free from safety regulation, workers may 
choose to trade workplace safety for higher wages 
or other desirable features of a job. Minimum safety 
standards cause some workers to accept something 
less than what they would consider an optimal mix 
of safety, wages, and other employment features 
(Pakko, 2005). One implication is that the introduc-
tion of a smoke-free law may cause some workers to 
leave employment at bar and restaurant businesses 
in municipalities with smoke-free laws, although 
the introduction also may encourage other workers 
to seek employment.
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Abstract: 
This study examines how smoke-free laws influence turnover among restaurant workers. The study uses a 
unique data set of payroll records of a franchisee of a national full-service restaurant chain operating 23 res-
taurants in the state of Arizona, a state where several communities have adopted smoke-free laws. Municipal 
smoke-free laws did not, on average, have a statistically significant effect on the probability of employee separa-
tion in the years after implementation. These results suggest that training costs associated with employee turn-
over would not rise for full-service restaurants in municipalities that adopt smoke-free laws.
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1. Bar and restaurant workers’ exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke 
is 1.5–4.4 times greater than that of individuals living with smokers 
(Siegel, 1993). For evidence that passive smoking causes coronary 
heart disease, lung cancer, and various respiratory ailments (see U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2006; Law and Wald, 
2003; Wells, 1998). Passive smokers also experience other health con-
ditions including eye irritation, headaches, nasal symptoms, coughs, 
wheezing, and hoarseness (Wakefield et al., 2003).
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Recent literature has examined the influence of 
smoke-free laws in terms of customer demand to pa-
tronize businesses in the hospitality industry (Cor-
sun, Young, and Enz, 1996; Glantz and Smith, 1997; 
Hyland, Cummings, and Nauenberg, 1999; Pakko, 
2005). Other recent literature has measured private 
market provision of smoke-free environments to ac-
commodate consumer preferences and the differ-
ential effect of smoke-free laws on restaurant and 
bar profitability (Dunham and Marlow, 2000, 2003, 
2004). The purpose of this study was to examine 
how laws influence employee turnover, which is a 
key determinant of operating cost for the industry. 
We examine whether the likelihood of employee 
separation from a job at a full-service restaurant is 
influenced by the introduction or presence of a lo-
cal smoke-free law, after controlling for other factors 
that influence employee separation.
II. Methodology
The likelihood of a worker separating from their job 
falls with tenure as workers learn more about the 
rewards and conditions of a particular job and em-
ployers learn more about the performance of work-
ers (Bartel and Borjas, 1977; Jovanovic, 1979; Viscusi, 
1980). Personal characteristics such as education, 
age, health, and sex further influence the likelihood 
of separation (Bartel and Borjas, 1977; Meitzen, 1986; 
Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981; Royalty, 1998).
The introduction of a smoke-free law also could 
influence the match between an existing worker 
and their job. The law may represent a shock to the 
“match” for existing workers, leading to an increase 
in separation rates. While many workers may pre-
fer to work in a smoke-free workplace, other job at-
tributes such as earnings from tips also may change 
as a municipal smoke-free law is implemented. 
Dunham and Marlow (2003) note that restaurants 
negatively impacted by smoke-free laws are more 
likely to increase job responsibilities for their work-
ers. Some existing workers may find the new bun-
dle of job attributes inferior to the previous arrange-
ment. This is particularly true of any group workers, 
such as workers who smoke, who may have found 
a smoking-allowed work environment to be an 
amenity.
The long-run effects of smoke-free laws on em-
ployee separation rates are less clear, however. Over 
the long run, there is turnover in staff. The match be-
tween new workers and their employers develop in 
the smoke-free environment, so that the smoke-free 
law does not represent any shock to the match. The 
employee separation rate in the long run could be 
higher, lower, or no different for restaurants in mu-
nicipalities with smoke-free laws.
In this study we use a panel data set with treat-
ment and control groups to examine the influence 
of local smoke-free laws on employee separations. 
A logistic regression of employee separation was 
estimated using data on employees of a franchiser 
of a national restaurant chain operating in the state 
of Arizona over a 5-year period. The chain oper-
ates full-service restaurants serving alcohol, with 
seating for an average of 190 customers, and offer-
ing mid-price meals. Dunham and Marlow (2000, 
2003) note that the introduction of smoke-free laws 
has a varying impact on different segments of the 
restaurant industry. Profitability is most impacted 
in restaurants with more seating, a larger share of 
sales from alcohol, and a larger share of seating in 
the smoking-allowed section but is not impacted 
by whether a restaurant is part of a chain or inde-
pendent.2 The restaurants we examine, with large 
seating capacity and alcohol sales, have the char-
acteristics of restaurants likely to be impacted by 
smoke-free laws.
The panel data set included payroll records avail-
able for two-week pay periods for employees of 23 
Arizona restaurants from April 1999 to April 2004 
(see Table 1), as well as employee characteristics 
such as age, race, gender, and occupation. Each 2-
wk employee pay period served as a single observa-
tion. The restaurant franchiser allowed smoking at 
its restaurants in the absence of a municipal smoke-
free law. Of the 23 restaurants, 12 were located in 
municipalities with a smoke-free law as of 2004. 
Presence of a smoke-free ordinance was obtained 
from the Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights data-
base (http://www.no-smoke.org) and confirmed 
with the company management.
Three of the restaurants opened smoke free (one 
in Tucson, one in Mesa, and one in Gilbert). The 
smoke-free ordinance in Mesa also was imple-
mented before April 1999, so that our database for 
the Mesa restaurants only contained observations 
for workers in the period after the smoke-free law 
was in effect. Six remaining restaurants were in 
2.  Dunham and Marlow (2004) report that chain restaurants offered 
more space for nonsmoking seating.
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municipalities that were not smoke free in April 
1999, but then implemented a smoke-free law later 
either in October 1999 (Tucson), May 2000 (Tempe), 
or in October 2003 (Chandler). Given the relatively 
short tenure of restaurant workers (see Table 2), the 
7 months of pre-ban data for workers in Tucson res-
taurants and 12 months in Tempe are sufficient for 
pre-ban and post-ban comparisons of separation 
rates within restaurants.
The two treatment groups used in the analysis in-
cluded restaurant payroll records during any period 
when a restaurant operated under a local smoke-
free law. Treatment Group I included 14,927 post-
ban payroll records from employees who worked 
at a restaurant both before and after the municipal-
ity where the restaurant was located implemented a 
smoke-free law. For these workers, the introduction 
of a smoke-free law represented a potential “shock” 
to their work situation. Treatment Group II included 
69,966 payroll records for employees who worked 
at a restaurant only after the restaurant’s munici-
pality implemented a smoke-free law.3 The control 
group in the analysis consisted of restaurant pay-
roll records during any period when the restaurant 
did not face a local smoke-free law, either because 
the municipality where the restaurant was located 
never had a smoke-free law or because the law was 
not yet in effect. There were 90,810 payroll records 
in the control group.
Age, gender, ethnicity, job tenure, occupation, 
and separation date were obtained from company 
payroll system records. The payroll database did 
not include data on other personal characteristics of 
workers that could influence employee separation 
rates, such as education level and marital status, or 
other factors that could influence worker reaction to 
a municipal smoke-free ordinance, such as smoking 
Table 1. Statistics for Arizona Restaurants. 
                                                                                                                                                                Date Community
Location                         Opened                                County                  Went Smoke Free 
Restaurants in communities with smoke-free laws as of 2004
Mesa, Arizona (1) December 1992 Maricopa July 1996
Mesa, Arizona (2) November 1992 Maricopa July 1996
Mesa, Arizona (3) June 1993 Maricopa July 1996
Mesa, Arizona (4) November 1998 Maricopa July 1996
Tempe, Arizona (1) June 1994 Maricopa May 2000
Tempe, Arizona (2) April 1997 Maricopa May 2000
Chandler, Arizona November 1997 Maricopa October 2003
Gilbert, Arizona May 2002 Maricopa May 2001
Tucson, Arizona (1) September 1991 Pima October 1999
Tucson, Arizona (2) May 1994 Pima October 1999
Tucson, Arizona (3) March 1997 Pima October 1999
Tucson, Arizona (4) January 2000 Pima October 1999
Restaurants in communities without smoke-free laws as of 2004
Phoenix, Arizona (1) December 1992 Maricopa No
Phoenix, Arizona (2) May 1995 Maricopa No
Phoenix, Arizona (3) October 1995 Maricopa No
Phoenix, Arizona (4) June 2002 Maricopa No
Peoria, Arizona September 1993 Maricopa No
Scottsdale, Arizona December 1994 Maricopa No
Prescott, Arizona February 1996 Yavapai No
Glendale, Arizona August 1996 Maricopa No
Goodyear, Arizona October 2000 Maricopa No
Surprise, Arizona June 2001 Maricopa No
Sierra Vista, Arizona September 2003 Cochise No
3. Therefore, Treatment Group II included payroll records for employ-
ees of the three restaurants that opened smoke free, and employees of 
the nine restaurants in Treatment Group I who started working there 
only after the restaurant became smoke free.
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behavior. Observations were available for each 2-wk 
pay period for the entire employment period. Sep-
aration was assumed to occur at the date of each 
worker’s last entry in the payroll record. Of the ap-
proximately 9,300 workers in the payroll database, 
roughly one-third were still employed with the fran-
chiser at the end of the data set.
The first model pooled observations from mem-
bers of Treatment Group I, Treatment Group II, and 
the control group. This model examined the impact 
of a smoke-free law on the probability of separa-
tion for all restaurant employees after a smoke-free 
law was in effect, regardless of when the workers 
began working at the restaurants. A variable indi-
cating whether each employee’s place of work op-
erated under a smoke-free law in a particular pay 
period was assigned a value of 1 for all members 
of either Treatment Group I or II and a value of 0 
for all members of the control group. The probabil-
ity of separation for employees in any particular pe-
riod was modeled as a function of an employee’s job 
tenure, job tenure squared, and personal character-
istics (age, gender, and race/ethnicity), as well as 
a variable indicating the presence of a smoke-free 
law. There also was a dummy variable for each res-
taurant to control for idiosyncratic working condi-
tions, and a dummy variable for each month-year 
from April 1999 through April 2004 to account for 
season and business cycle impacts. Some employ-
ees had two employment spells at a restaurant, and 
each spell was treated as separate members of the 
panel. A dummy variable was used to indicate the 
second employment spell. In the logistic regression, 
standard errors were adjusted for clustering on em-
ployee-specific identification numbers.
The second model pooled Treatment Group I with 
the control group. The third model pooled Treat-
ment Group II with the control group. For all three 
models, we present coefficient estimates from the lo-
gistic regression as well as estimates of each vari-
able’s marginal effect.
Models 1 through 3 contain a single dummy 
variable indicating that an employee works at a 
restaurant in a municipality covered by a smoke-
free law during a particular pay period. Coefficient 
estimates for the dummy variable indicate that the 
average effect of a smoke-free law on employee 
turnover in the years after the law is in effect. The 
models, however, do not capture how the effect of 
smoke-free laws may vary over time. In particu-
lar, such a law may have a differential effect in the 
first few months it is in effect relative to the longer 
term. It is in this initial period when most existing 
workers are facing a shock to working condition 
in regards to secondhand smoke in the workplace. 
In the longer run, as there is a natural turnover in 
restaurant staff, most workers will have joined the 
staff after the municipal smoke-free law was in 
place. The long-run effect, if any, could differ from 
the initial effect.
We tested for this possibility by developing an 
additional model. In this fourth model, we use the 
full sample from the first model (both the treatment 
groups and the control group) and replace the sin-
gle dummy variable indicating that the smoke-free 
law is in effect with a set of 13 dummy variables, 
which indicate the amount of time that had passed 
since the law went into effect. The first dummy in-
dicates that the smoke-free law was in effect for one 
quarter or less; the second dummy indicates that the 
law was in effect from 4 to 6 months (i.e., the sec-
ond quarter after the law went into effect). There are 
12 such dummy variables for the first 12 quarters 
Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
Variable                                         Mean        Standard Deviation 
Probability of separation and tenure
% separating during  
the pay period 4.2 20.0
Tenure (d) 539 632
Tenure squared (d) 685.343 1,603,303
Personal characteristics
Gender (%)
Male 47.8 50.0
Female 52.2 50.0
Age (years) 26.1 7.0
Race (%)
White 71.4 45.2
Black 3.0 17.1
Hispanic 20.3 40.2
American Indian/Alaska  
Native 1.2 11.0
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.1 2.9
Not specified 4.0 19.5
Occupation (%)
Server 54.8 49.8
Hostess 17.1 37.6
Bartender 2.0 13.9
Kitchen 24.3 42.9
All other occupations 1.8 13.4
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the law is in effect, and a final dummy variable in-
dicating that the law had been effect for more than 
3 years.
III. Results
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the work-
ers in this sample. On average, 4.2% of workers 
separated from employment during a single 2-wk 
pay period. The average tenure of workers at any 
time during the 5-year period was 539 days, which 
is roughly 1.5 years. More than half of the employ-
ees were female. More than 70% of workers were 
white, while roughly 20% were Hispanic and 3% 
were African American. The average age of work-
ers was 26 years (standard deviation = 7 years). 
More than half of the workers were employed as 
servers, about one-quarter as kitchen workers, one-
sixth as hosts, and a fraction as bartenders or other 
occupations.
Coefficient estimates from the logistic regression 
are presented in Table 3, along with estimates on the 
marginal effect of each variable on the probability 
of separation. The marginal effects are estimated at 
the mean value for all variables. Coefficients for in-
dividual month and restaurant dummies are not re-
ported for brevity but are available from the first au-
thor upon request.
Results for all workers in Table 3 are for the case 
where Treatment Group I, Treatment Group II, and 
the control group were pooled. The treatment group 
contains pay period observations for all workers at 
a restaurant operating under a smoke-free law, re-
gardless of whether they joined the restaurant be-
fore (Treatment Group I) or after (Treatment Group 
II) the smoke-free law went into effect.
Results for existing workers were for the case 
where Treatment Group I and the control group 
were pooled. The treatment group contains pay pe-
riod observations for workers at a restaurant oper-
ating under a smoke-free law but who joined the 
restaurant staff before the law was implemented. Re-
sults for new workers were for the case when Treat-
ment Group II and the control group were pooled. 
The treatment group contains pay period observa-
tions for workers who joined the restaurant staff 
only after the smoke-free law was in effect.
In all three regressions, the probability of separa-
tion fell with tenure in the job. At mean values for 
tenure and tenure squared, the marginal effect of 
additional days of tenure reduced the probability 
of separation. Further, re-estimates of the marginal 
effects at higher levels of tenure (such as tenure = 
2,000 days and tenure squared = 4,000,000 days) in-
dicated that the marginal effect of additional days of 
tenure would remain negative. Thus, the relation-
ship between the greater tenure and the probability 
of separation was negative even for an average ten-
ure of more than 5 years (2000 days is roughly 5.5 
years).
The probability of separation also was lower for 
workers in their second spell of employment at a res-
taurant in both the all workers and the new workers 
regression. This could have occurred because work-
ers in their second spell were more familiar with 
the requirements of the job and managers also were 
more familiar with the workers. No statistically sig-
nificant difference was found in the existing work-
ers regression, but this may have simply reflected 
the smaller sample size available.
The probability of separation was related to eth-
nicity in all three regressions. Relative to white 
workers, the probability of separation was lower 
for Hispanic workers. Gender was not related to the 
probability of separation in any of the three regres-
sions. In all three regressions, the probability of sep-
aration was lower for other occupations than for the 
omitted category, kitchen workers. This makes sense 
because the other occupations category includes 
managers who have longer tenure. The probability 
of separation also was lower for bartenders in two 
of the three regressions.
Finally, in all three regressions, no statistically 
significant relationship was found between the 
presence of a smoke-free law and the probability 
of employee separation. The coefficient on the “law 
in effect” variable is not statistically significant in 
any of the regressions. This implies that there is 
no effect, on average, on the probability of separa-
tion in the years after a smoke-free law is adopted 
by a municipality. This finding, however, does not 
preclude an effect in the initial periods after the 
smoke-free law is adopted when the law provides 
an initial shock to the working conditions of exist-
ing restaurant workers. For example, there could 
be an initial increase in separation rates for existing 
workers after the law is implemented, but several 
years later, the long-run separation rate (for work-
ers who joined the restaurant after the law was 
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implemented) may be lower in municipalities 
with smoke-free laws. The effect of the smoke-
free law on separation rates varies through 
time, but the average effect is zero.
To test this possibility, we estimated a fourth 
regression, where the “law in effect” variable 
from the all workers regression was replaced 
with 13 dummy variables indicating the length 
of time that a municipal smoke-free law had 
been in effect. Joint significance tests indicated 
that the coefficients on these 13 dummy vari-
ables were not jointly different from zero. This 
suggests that there was no significant effect on 
separation rates through time, just as no aver-
age effect was identified in Table 3.
Coefficients for several individual dummy 
variables were significant, however. In Fig-
ure 1, we present the individual estimates from 
this regression for these 13 dummy variables. 
In particular, we show the estimated marginal 
effect for each of the 12 quarterly dummy vari-
ables and the 13th variable indicating that the 
smoke-free law had been effect for more than 3 
years.
There is a statistically significant decline in 
the separation rate for workers in first quarter 
after the smoke-free law is implemented.4 In 
other words, workers are less likely to separate 
from their job in the first few months the law 
was in effect. Point estimates remain negative 
throughout the first eight quarters that the law 
was in effect, and the negative marginal effect 
is statistically significant in the sixth quarter. 
Point estimates alternate between negative and 
positive values beginning with the ninth quar-
ter and are not statistically significant. These 
quarterly results do not show a consistent im-
pact on separation rates.
Over the longer run, we did not find ev-
idence of a relationship between municipal 
smoke-free laws and separation rates. There 
was no statistically significant relationship be-
tween the introduction of municipal smoke-
free laws and the probability of separation be-
yond 18 months.
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4. We also examined whether the probability of separation 
changed in the quarter before the local smoking ban was imple-
mented, as workers anticipated the coming change. We did not 
find a statistically significant change in the chances of separa-
tion in the quarter before implementation.
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IV. Discussion and conclusions
Previous economic research on smoke-free laws has 
focused on how these laws affect demand for busi-
nesses in the hospitality industry or on the differen-
tial effect of smoke-free laws on restaurant and bar 
profitability. The current study is an effort to ex-
amine how smoke-free laws influence the behavior 
of restaurant workers. In particular, we examined 
how adoption of municipal smoke-free laws influ-
enced employee turnover, a key determinant of op-
erating costs in the restaurant and bar industry. We 
used a unique data set of employment records of a 
franchiser of a national restaurant chain operating 
23 full-service restaurants in the state of Arizona, 
a state where several municipalities have adopted 
smoke-free laws.
We found a statistically significant decline in the 
probability of separation in the initial months after 
a smoke-free law was implemented as well as evi-
dence that separation rates were lower 16–18 months 
after implementation. However, there was no con-
sistent pattern of either a decline or an increase 
in separation rates after the implementation of a 
smoke-free law. No average effect was identified in 
the years after implementation either for “existing” 
workers who were employed at the restaurant at the 
time of implementation or for “new” workers who 
joined the restaurant after implementation. While 
we found a statistically significant decline in sepa-
ration rates in two quarters, the joint effect on sepa-
ration rates across all quarters was not significantly 
different from zero. Further, there was no evidence 
of a relationship between smoke-free laws and em-
ployee separation beyond 18 months.
Taken together, these results suggest that mu-
nicipal smoke-free laws did not change the separa-
tion rate for workers in the long run. The laws also 
did not induce an increase in employee turnover in 
the initial period after implementation by disrupt-
ing the match between existing full-service restau-
rant workers and their employers. The latter result 
implies that in the quarters after the implementa-
tion of a smoke-free law, the change in bundle of 
working conditions—which could include changes 
in earnings from tips as well as the change in work-
place smoking—did not increase the rate of separa-
tion among existing workers overall.
By contrast, the limited evidence we did find of 
a change in separation rates suggests that restau-
rant workers are for a period more likely to remain 
in their job after the implementation of a smoke-free 
law, perhaps experimenting with the new working 
conditions.
These aggregate results do not imply that munic-
ipal smoke-free laws have no impact on the welfare 
of restaurant workers. The mix of working condi-
tions after the introduction of a smoke-free law may 
not match what many workers would have chosen 
in the absence of a regulation, even if the discrepan-
cies did not appear to be large enough to drive up 
separation rates. Further, our analysis of aggregate 
separation rates may mask an increase in separation 
rates for some groups of workers, such as smokers. 
But it is important for business owners, who face 
the training costs associated with employee turn-
over, that the implementation of municipal smoke-
free laws did not lead to an increase in aggregate 
separation rates for restaurants of the franchiser we 
studied.
These restaurants, which provide mid-price 
meals and serve alcohol, are common throughout 
the United States. Several recent studies have in-
dicated that larger restaurants serving alcohol are 
the types of restaurants whose profitability may be 
more likely to be affected by smoke-free laws (Dun-
ham and Marlow, 2000, 2003). Findings regarding 
employee separation in these restaurants are there-
fore of general interest and do not merely repre-
sent a niche segment or lightly impacted portion 
of the industry. This said, it is not known whether 
the same effect (or lack of effect) on separation rates 
would be found in other restaurants that offer a dif-
ferent mix of services to a different customer base. 
Figure 1. Marginal Effect of the Presence of a Local Smoke-
Free Law on the Probability of Separation. ■ indicates statisti-
cal significance at the 10% confidence level.
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Future research on employee separation rates needs 
to focus on workers in other segments of the restau-
rant industry.
Future research on separation rates may be able 
to identify the effect of laws on specific groups of 
workers, such as smokers. Such research also may 
be able to gather data on additional factors that in-
fluence employee separation, including employee 
education level and family structure, or major life 
changes faced by employees, such as graduation 
from high school or college.
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